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INSOLVENCY LAWS AROUND
THE WORLD – A STATISTICAL




The growing literature on law and finance suggests
that the development of capital markets is promoted
by greater investor protection,while more developed
credit markets exist in countries with greater creditor
protection.1 An important component of a country’s
creditor rights is its insolvency framework, which
together with a supporting judicial environment af-
fects the degree to which commercial distress is
resolved using formal bankruptcy proceedings.
Strong bankruptcy regimes also play a role in deter-
mining higher liquidation values and improved
chances of ex-post firm survival. A good insolvency
regime is one with ex ante screening mechanisms that
prevent managers and shareholders from taking
imprudent loans and lenders from giving loans with a
high probability of default.At the same time it should
also deliver an ex-post efficient outcome, in that the
highest total value is obtained for the distressed firm
with the least direct costs and loss in going concern
value. Recent financial crises in Argentina and
Russia have highlighted the importance of well-func-
tioning insolvency systems in preventing and resolv-
ing corporate sector financial distress.
Consequently, there is increased interest in the
design of insolvency systems from the points of
resource allocation,efficiency,and stability as well as
equality and fairness. There are many aspects in
which insolvency regimes differ across countries.
Investigating the actual use of the bankruptcy
regime in relation to countries’ specific insolvency
features can be a way to shed light on the impor-
tance of particular creditor rights.
Insolvency around the world
Insolvency regimes are complex in design as they try
to balance several objectives, including protecting
the rights of creditors – essential to the mobilization
of capital for investment and working capital and
other resources – and preventing the premature liq-
uidation of viable firms. In addition to legal rights,
there is a need for an efficient judicial system to
enforce these rights, or at least to serve as a credible
enforcement threat,and to speedily conduct the pro-
cess of liquidation or restructuring when so desired.
These different objectives and constraints have led
to differences in insolvency and collateral regimes
across countries, as well as considerable variation in
the actual use of bankruptcy proceedings to resolve
financial distress. The fact that the literature has
found no strong relationships between (an index of)
creditor rights, on the one hand, and various aspects
of financial sector development and functioning, on
the other, may relate to the difficulty of capturing
the many features of insolvency regimes.
In a recent study,Claessens and Klapper (2005) doc-
ument the actual usage of bankruptcy across coun-
tries and provide insight on how creditor rights fea-
tures affect actual bankruptcy use.Previous research
has been based on the use of an index of CREDI-
TOR RIGHTS consisting of the summation of four
dummy variables, with four the highest possible
score (La Porta et al., 1998).The components are:
a) Restrictive Reorganization, equal to 1 if the time-
table for rendering a judgment is less than 90 days;
b) Mandatory Management Turnover, equal to 1 if
incumbent management does not stay during a
restructuring or bankruptcy;
c) No Automatic Stay, equal to 1 if there is no auto-
matic stay on assets;
d) Secured Creditors Priority, equal to 1 if secured
creditors have the highest priority in payment.
This paper tests whether there are differences be-
tween the effects of each specific creditor rights on
* World Bank and CEPR.
** World Bank.
1 See Levine (2004) for a review of the literature.firm and creditor behavior. For instance, a stipula-
tion in the insolvency law that provides creditors
with the right of no automatic stay on assets also
provides creditors with some bargaining power that
may allow them to more easily negotiate debt
restructuring out of court. At the same time, the
absence of an automatic stay may lead to a creditor
race to seize assets, thus possibly accelerating the
possibility of financial distress and bankruptcy.
However, previous guidelines for an effective insol-
vency and creditor right system suggests that there
should preferably be an automatic stay on assets for
at least some initial period (World Bank, 2001).This
suggests that there are some differences of opinion
on what constitute desirable creditor rights features,
which in turn may relate to lack of understanding on
how certain creditor rights features affect actual
bankruptcy use.
The presence in the law of secured creditor priority
and absolute priority of claims in bankruptcy or
restructuring (i.e.,senior creditors are paid first,then
junior creditors, followed finally by shareholders if
any residual remains) is another example. Such pri-
ority may deter ex-ante risky financial behavior and
thus reduce the likelihood of financial distress. But
such feature can also help overcome creditor coordi-
nation problems when a corporation is in restructur-
ing.At the same time,if the law stipulates that share-
holders receive nothing in bankruptcy, a firm may
attempt to delay or avoid bankruptcy, including
undertaking more high-risk projects when the cor-
poration starts to run into financial distress. Alter-
natively, an insolvency law that stipulates that man-
agers must automatically leave when a firm is in bank-
ruptcy,might be associated with greater use of bank-
ruptcy as creditors will stand to gain more from using
this right in formal bankruptcy procedures. These
discussions show that each of the specific creditor
right features may influence firm and creditor be-
havior differently and what constitutes a desirable
creditor right feature may depend on circumstances
or objectives.
To examine these arguments, the authors analyze
how actual bankruptcy filings relate to countries’
individual creditor rights and overall judicial effi-
ciency in order to identify which creditor rights are
more important and how a strong judicial system af-
fects their relative importance. The authors con-
structed a unique dataset on the number of commer-
cial bankruptcy filings in 35 countries, which includ-
ed all legal proceedings designed to either liquidate
or rehabilitate insolvent firms. The average number
of total commercial bankruptcy filings was collected
from government and private sources for the period
1990 to 1999.The main insolvency measure was con-
structed by including firms that filed for liquidation
or reorganization; thus the measure refers to the
total use of the bankruptcy law and the associated
judicial system to resolve corporate financial dis-
tress.A description of the macroeconomic and legal
variables used for the 35 countries examined is given
in Table 1.
Panel regressions (not shown) find, controlling for
overall economic development and macroeconomic
shocks,that bankruptcies are more frequent in coun-
tries with better functioning judicial systems. The
efficiency of the legal system is significantly and pos-
itively related to filing for bankruptcy – the greater
the likelihood a creditor can efficiently restructure
and collect using the court, the more likely creditors
are to use formal bankruptcy proceedings in the case
of default. However, CREDITOR RIGHTS, a sim-
ple index for the presence of creditor rights alone,as
used in past research,is not associated with a greater
use of bankruptcy. The overall strength of creditor
rights is negatively, but not significantly, related to
the occurrence of bankruptcy across countries,
although the coefficient for judicial efficiency
remains statistically significant.
Of primary importance is the shift from aggregate
creditor rights to its individual components. Regres-
sion results on that basis are summarized in Table 2.
In Column 1, CREDITOR RIGHTS and each of the
four subindices are included in separate regressions.
Of the four subindices, one is significantly positive –
RESTRICTIVE REORGANIZATION – and one is
significant negative – NO AUTOMATIC STAY. The
other two subindexes, SECURED CREDITORS
PAID FIRST and MANDATORY MANAGEMENT
TURNOVER, are not significant. These differences
suggest that the deterrence and actual bankruptcy
usage effects vary by individual creditor rights and
that a simple aggregation of creditor right character-
istics is problematic.
For example, restrictions on reorganization, such as
creditors’ consent, provides creditors with more
legal tools and reduces the debtor’s degrees of free-
dom, leading to greater use of bankruptcy, including
reorganizations. In contrast, the ability of secured
creditors to seize assets even when a firm has filed
for bankruptcy seems to deter the filing for bank-
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ruptcy. This suggests that bankruptcy is a more effi-
cient tool to use when there is an automatic stay on
assets, as it helps avoid a creditor race.The no auto-
matic stay provision may, however, still be useful in
weak judicial environments as otherwise creditors
may be too vulnerable to the discretion of the judi-
cial system.The fact that creditor priority is not sig-
nificant may indicate that the priority creditor rights
feature deters risky behavior and thus reduces the
probability of financial distress. It may also reflect
that most laws permitting secured creditor rights al-
low a creditor to seize its secured assets out of court,
i.e., without the creditor having to file for bankrupt-
cy.The insignificant sign for the mandatory manage-
ment turnover index may reflect two opposing ef-
fects.For some firms,the requirement to replace man-
agement when in bankruptcy is discouraging when
incumbent management provides useful skills and
know-how. For other firms, there may be value for
creditors to be able to replace management immedi-
ately when using bankruptcy procedures; for exam-
ple, when incumbent management may be delaying
necessary,but painful restructurings.On balance,this
may explain why an insignificant sign results.
Of further interest is the interaction between the
effects of judicial efficiency and the individual and
aggregate creditor rights. Column 2 shows, in addi-
tion to the CREDITOR RIGHTS (sub-) indices and
the RULE OF LAW index, the interaction between
the two indexes included in the regressions. These
regression results generally confirm the earlier find-
ing that efficient courts lead to greater usage of
bankruptcy, as does the presence of creditor rights,
Table 1 













Argentina 92–99 2,144 0.12 French 5.35 1
Ausralia 90–99 5,505 2.10 English 10 1
Austria 90–99 2,065 1.33 German 10 3
Belgium 90–99 4,850 2.59 French 10 2
Canada 90–98 12,697 2.96 English 10 1
Chile 90–99 89 0.28 French 7.02 2
Colombia 96–99 226 0.16 French 2.08 0
Czech Republic 92–96 1,729 1.49 Transition 8.3 3
Denmark 90–99 2,376 1.53 Scandinavian 10 3
Finland 90–98 5,106 4.14 Scandinavian 10 1
France 90–99 51,672 2.62 French 8.98 0
Germany 92–98 21,153 1.03 German 9.23 3
Greece 90–94 857 0.29 French 6.18 1
Hong Kong 90–98 1,519 0.55 English 8.22 4
Hungary 92–96 8,425 1.99 Transition 8.7 3.75
Ireland 90–99 789 2.74 English 7.8 1
Italy 90–96 8,663 0.54 French 8.33 2
Japan 90–99 14,001 0.22 German 8.98 2
Netherlands 90–99 3,996 1.30 French 10 2
New Zealand 93–98 716 3.67 English 10 3
Norway 90–98 3,547 1.83 Scandinavian 10 2
Peru 93–99 145 0.05 French 2.5 0
Poland 90–96 3,320 0.23 Transition 8.7 2.25
Portugal 91–99 516 0.08 French 8.68 1
Russia 95–98 2,771 0.31 Transition 3.7 3
Singapore 90–99 228 3.06 English 8.57 4
South Africa 90–99 2,919 4.62 English 4.42 3
South Korea 90–98 163 0.17 German 5.35 3
Spain 90–99 519 0.02 French 7.8 2
Sweden 90–99 13,917 7.61 Scandinavian 10 2
Switzerland 90–98 9,213 3.33 German 10 1
Thailand 90–99 372 0.13 French 6.25 3
Turkey 98–99 1,496 0.86 French 5.18 2
U.K. 93–98 46,584 1.85 English 8.57 4
U.S.A. 90–99 55,753 3.65 English 10 1
Statistics are reported as the average over available years. Number of bankruptcies were collected from country
sources. BNKRPT is the ratio of the  number of bankruptcies to the number of firms.except for the no automatic stay provision.The neg-
ative signs for many of the interaction terms suggest
a substitution effect: in countries with high judicial
efficiency, actions by the courts substitute to some
extent for strong creditor rights and encourage more
use of bankruptcy procedures. Well functioning
courts may weigh, for example, the balance between
the costs and benefits of having management stay or
leave when filing for bankruptcy and provide a bet-
ter judgment whether the debtor is cooperative or
not in making restructuring proposals.
The lack of significance of the in-
teraction term for NO AUTO-
MATIC STAY may imply that
while an automatic stay on assets
is triggered by a court, it is a sim-
ple court action that does not
require much further action by
the judiciary and as such is less
affected by the efficiency of a
country’s court system. These
substitution effects in turn sug-
gest that in countries with weak
judicial proceedings creditors
will use bankruptcy – a costly re-
solution – only if they have very
strong entitlements. For example,
in order for creditors to imple-
ment their rights,a business envi-
ronment that allows for easy and
electronic registering of collater-
al may be more important than
the availability of efficient courts,
leading to the insignificant coef-
ficients for creditor rights and the
interaction term.
As robustness checks, additional
regressions included the follow-
ing control variables (results not
shown):
a) Restrictiveness of Entry,
b) Regulation of Labor Markets,
c) the ratio of the Number of To-
tal Patents to the Total Number
of Manufacturing Firms,
d) the percentage of Employment
attributed to Small-Medium-
sized Enterprises (SMEs).
The main results are robust to
the inclusion of these variables.
Furthermore, countries in which
it is more restrictive and difficult to open a new
business are found to have lower bankruptcy
rates. Restrictive employment laws are signifi-
cantly negatively related to the use of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy is used relatively more often in coun-
tries that use more intangible assets in their econ-
omy (as proxied by the number of patents), possi-
bly because bankruptcy and reorganization proce-
dures allow better for the preservation of these
assets. Finally, SMEs are less likely to use bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
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Table 2 
Cross-country regressions with creditor rights and legal efficiency 
Creditor rights and 
legal efficiency
Creditor rights and 
legal efficiency: 
interaction effects
(1) Rule of Law 0.258*** 0.438***
(2.81) (5.77)
Creditor Rights –0.067 0.892**
(–0.85) (2.50)
Rule of Law * Creditor – –0.125***
  Rights (–3.00)
Adj. R–squared 0.17 0.20
(2) Rule of Law 0.242*** 0.383***
(2.94) (5.81)
Restrictive Reorganization 0.563** 4.584***
(2.30) (3.76)
Rule of Law * Restrictive
  Reorganization – –0.482***
(–3.34)
Adj. R–squared 0.19 0.24
(3) Rule of Law 0.316*** 0.299***
(3.68) (3.27)
No Automatic Stay –0.987*** –1.734***
(–5.12) (–2.76)
Rule of Law * No Automatic – 0.090
  Stay (1.23)
Adj. R-squared 0.231 0.23
(4) Rule of Law 0.251*** 0.298***
(2.77) (3.90)
Secured Creditor Paid First 0.120 0.726
(0.48) (0.86)
Rule of Law * Creditor – –0.085
  Rights (–0.79)
Adj. R-squared 0.169 0.17
(5) Rule of Law 0.253*** 0.422***
(3.04) (5.59)
Mandatory Management –0.014 3.492***
 Turnover (–0.05) (3.24)
Rule of Law * Mand. Mana- – –0.463***
 gement Turnover (–3.29)
Adj. R-squared 0.169 0.21
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies to the
number of firms. Transition countries are excluded from all regressions
because of the unavailability of disaggregated creditor rights. The
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard
errors. t-statistics are in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  All regressions include lagged values of
GDP per capita, annual GDP growth rates, a dummy indicating a financial
crisis, interest rates and year fixed effects. All regressions include 273
observations.CESifo DICE Report 1/2006 13
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The World Bank’s “Principles & Guidelines”
The results of Claessens and Klapper (2005) suggest
that well designed bankruptcy laws may encourage a
greater use of formal bankruptcy proceedings. In an
ongoing dialogue since 2001, the World Bank (2005)
has developed a catalogue of Principles and Guide-
lines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights
Systems. This manuscript presents 33 principles that
countries should adopt to promote more efficient
resolution of financial distress. These are separated
into four broad focus areas as summarized in Table 3
and briefly described below.
The legal framework for creditor rights
The first group establishes principles for the creation
of enforcement mechanisms to promote credit mar-
kets.These principles set a framework for the protec-
tion of credit providers in terms of the allowance of
security interests in both immovable (i.e. mortgages,
charges etc.) and movable property (whether tangible
or intangible). They further point
out the imperativeness in creating
integrated and accessible registry
systems providing accurate (and
electronic) records of security in-
terests. Finally, the principles high-
light need for supportive commer-
cial enforcement systems. These
entail both judicial and non-judi-
cial mechanisms and procedures
that provide efficient, transparent
and reliable enforcement of secur-
ed and unsecured debt.
The risk management and corpo-
rate workout
The second area of interest shifts
from the legal framework to the
corporate workout and puts forth
five principles related to risk man-
agement. First, access to complete
credit information of borrowers’
borrowing and payment history
(i.e. both positive and negative in-
formation) is stressed.This requires
a supporting legal framework,
mechanisms for data protection,
policies prohibiting societal dis-
crimination and protecting sub-
jects’ privacy, as well as continu-
ous monitoring of the systems’
operation. Second, the necessity
for setting legal standards of di-
rector and officer accountability
on behalf of distressed or insol-
vent enterprises is underlined.The
third principle concerns the exis-
tence of an enabling legislative
framework that ensures the possi-
bility of restructuring and restora-
tion of distressed but financially
viable enterprises.The fourth prin-
 Table 3 
World BankPrinciples for Effective Insolvency and
Creditor Rights Systems 
Part A. Legal Framework for Creditor Rights
A1 Compatible Commercial Law Systems
A2 Security (Real Property)
A3 Security (Movable Property)
A4 Recording and Registration of Secured Rights
A5 Commercial Enforcement Systems
Part B. Risk Management and Corporate Workout
B1 Credit InformationSystems
B2 Director & Officer Accountability
B3 Enabling Legislative Framework
B4 Corporate Workout - Restructuring Procedures
B5 Regulation of Workout and Risk Management
Part C. Legal Framework for Insolvency
C1 Key Objectives and Policies
C2 Due Process: Notification and Information
Commencement
C3 Eligibility
C4 Applicability and Accessibility
C5 Provisional Measures and Effects of Commencement
Governance
C6 Management
C7 Creditors and Creditors Committee
Administration
C8 Collection, Preservation, Administration and Disposition of Assets
C9 Stabilizing and Sustaining Business operations
C10 Treatment of Contractual Obligations
C11 Avoidable Transactions
Claims and Claims Resolution
C12 Treatment of Stakeholder Rights & Priorities
C13 Claims Filing and Resolution
Reorganization Proceedings
C14 Plan Formulation and Consideration
Voting and Approval of Plan
Implementation and Amendment
Discharge and Binding Effects
Plan Revocation and Case Closure
C15 International Consideration
Part D. Implementation: Institutional and Regulatory Frameworks
D1 Role of Courts
D2 Judicial Selection, Qualification, Training and Performance
D3 Court Organization
D4 Transparency and Accountability
D5 Judicial Decision making and Enforcement
D6 Integrity of the System (Courts and Participants)
D7 Role of Regulatory or Supervisory Bodies
D8 Competence andIntegrity of Insolvency Administratorsciple promotes the use of informal workout practices
such as voluntary negotiation, mediation and infor-
mal dispute resolution as complements or useful
precedents of formal proceedings. The last principle
pertains to regulation and practice and endorses an
environment where financial institutions and regula-
tors support a consensual code of conduct.
The legal framework for insolvency
The third pillar of regulatory principles focuses on
the insolvency framework. Of great importance is
the timing and the proper use of the insolvency sys-
tem, its balance with reorganization practices, the
asset value maximization for creditor recovery pro-
tection, and the establishment of a cross-border in-
solvency framework. The protection of the rights of
the related parties is examined, with a special focus
on practices of notification and information. For
instance,the right to be heard must be guaranteed to
all parties involved and intermediation by impartial
and independent experts and investigators must be
offered for the resolution of a dispute.
The next three principles focus on the commence-
ment of the insolvency processes. Both debtors and
creditors should be entitled to apply for insolvency
proceedings, and when creditors do, debtors must be
given the opportunity to defend against the applica-
tion in court before the commencement of the case.
After insolvency proceedings commence, measures
must be granted to protect the debtor’s assets and
the interest of stakeholders. This entails a stay of
actions by secured creditors in reorganization pro-
ceedings, although the stay must always be of limit-
ed, specified duration, balancing between creditor
protection and insolvency objectives.
The next two principles focus on governance while
under insolvency proceedings.The guidelines recom-
mend either 
a) exclusive control is entrusted to an independent
insolvency representative;
b) management remains in control; or
c) supervision of management is undertaken by the
independent representative or supervisor.
In the latter two approaches,complete power should
be shifted to the independent authority if manage-
ment displays any form of misbehavior or incompe-
tence.
The seventh guideline safeguards creditors’ role and
rights during proceedings.The preferred mechanism
to ensure fairness and integrity is a creditors’ com-
mittee, especially when the creditors are numerous.
The functions of the committee should be chartered
by the law and it should serve as a conduit for pro-
cessing and distributing information to the creditors
and facilitating their decision processes. Principles 
8 – 11 refer to administration of debtor’s assets,which
should be protected during proceedings. For instance,
ordinary operations should be permitted the business
should have access to sound, monitored financing in
order to meet ongoing needs.
The last four principles concern claim resolutions
under insolvency. Priority is given to the collateral of
secured creditors, followed by unsecured creditors.
Consideration to employee rights should be given,
while shareholders are entitled to compensation
either when creditors have been fully repaid or under
limited exceptions. The reorganization plan must be
structured and approved by the majority of creditors
and its implementation should be independently
supervised and be open to amendment. Finally, inter-
national aspects of insolvency proceedings are exam-
ined, and rules for their facilitation are set.
The implemenation strategy, in terms of the institu-
tional and regulatory frameworks
The forth group of principles present eight guide-
lines concerning the implementation of the afore-
mentioned principles. These consider the role of
courts, the judicial selection, training and perfor-
mance, and court organization. Of key importance is
transparency, accountability and integrity of the sys-
tem.The last two principles examine the role of reg-
ulatory or supervisory bodies appointing insolvency
representatives. Criteria ensuring the integrity and
competence of these representatives are established.
Conclusion
A better understanding of how the different features
of creditor rights are individually related to bank-
ruptcy rates use can be useful for policymakers.
Claessens and Klapper (2005) show that while the
overall index of creditor rights is not statistically sig-
nificantly associated with more use of bankruptcy,
there exist statistically significant effects for individ-
ual creditor rights, which also differ in direction.
Specifically, the presence of a “no automatic stay” is
associated with fewer bankruptcies and the presence
in the law of a “restriction on reorganizations” with
CESifo DICE Report 1/2006 14
ForumCESifo DICE Report 1/2006 15
Forum
more bankruptcies. The use of bankruptcy also var-
ies by the efficiency of the judicial system. Greater
judicial efficiency is associated with more use of bank-
ruptcy, but the combination of more creditor rights
with greater judicial efficiency leads to less use, sug-
gesting some substitution between creditor rights
and judicial efficiency.
These findings suggest that insolvency systems with
greater creditor rights and efficient judicial systems
encourage less risky behavior and more out-of-court
settlements. They also suggest that strong creditor
rights are more necessary in countries with weak
judicial systems to compensate for weaknesses in
legal enforcement. The World Bank (2005) Prin-
ciples and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and
Creditor Rights Systems proposes a framework for
efficient bankruptcy proceedings and resolution of
financial distress. Implementation of these design
features may in turn affect the relative use and im-
portance of bankruptcy across countries.
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